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# Town Meeting



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## What Next In Korea?

*Moderator, GUNNAR BACK*

*Speaker*

**DR. YOU CHAN YANG**

*Interrogators*

**ROBERT SMITH**

**ROBERT OLIVER**



**COMING**

— June 30, 1953 —


**Is the Fifth Amendment Being Misused?**

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## What Next in Korea?

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### THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

**DR. YOU CHAN YANG**—Ambassador from the Republic of South Korea to the United States. Dr. You Chan Yang was born in Pusan, Korea, in 1897 and moved with his parents to Hawaii in 1903. He was educated at the Kashumanu School, McKinley High School, University of Hawaii and the Boston University College of Liberal Arts. He received his M.D. from the latter university in 1922, and interned at the New York Post-Graduate Hospital and New York Lying-In Hospital. Dr. Yang has been engaged in private medical practice in Honolulu since 1923. He is trustee and board chairman of the Korean Christian Institute and is associated with several professional societies in Hawaii and Korea. Dr. Yang assumed his present post in Washington in June, 1951, just about a year after the Korean war broke out.

**ROBERT AURA SMITH** (Interrogator)—Editorial Writer, the *New York Times*; expert on the Far East. Born in Denver, Colorado, in 1899, Robert Aura Smith was graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University, and as a Rhodes Scholar received his masters degree from Oxford University. He returned to the United States to be associate professor of English at Drake University from 1920-21 and later taught at Evansville College from 1924-25. In 1925 he joined the editorial staff of the *Cincinnati Commercial Tribune* and during the next few years was also a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*. He left for Manila in 1930 to become news editor of the *Manila Daily Bulletin* and a staff correspondent for the *New York Times*. In 1937 he switched to the *Times'* cable desk, and since 1945 has been associated with the paper's foreign news department. During World War II, Mr. Smith worked with the OWI in India and New York. He returned to teaching in 1945 as a lecturer at Yale and from 1946-47 at Barnard. He is now widely known as a lecturer on the Far East as well as the author of *Our Future in Asia* (1940); *Your Foreign Policy* (1941); and *Divided India* (1947).

**ROBERT T. OLIVER** (Interrogator)—Author of *Verdict in Korea* (1952), consultant to South Korean Government; professor of speech at Pennsylvania State College. Born in Sweet Home, Oregon in 1909, Mr. Oliver received

(Continued on page 15)

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## What Next in Korea?

### Moderator Back:

Tonight's Town Meeting subject, I am sure you will agree, needs very little introduction. Several days before the third anniversary of the Korean War and in the light of very fast-breaking news events, we are going to discuss what next in Korea. You know that the South Korean President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, has it in his power to help immeasurably in determining the answer. What does he intend to do? Why has he taken the steps he has taken to interrupt the truce? Tonight we will ask those questions again of Dr. You Chan Yang, the Korean Ambassador to the United States. And to help throw what light we can on a crucial question and perhaps a crucial week, we will also hear tonight from two close students of and, indeed, authorities on the Korean problem.

Mr. Robert Aura Smith, an editorial writer for the New York Times, and Dr. Robert T. Oliver, author of *How War Came to Korea* and consultant to the South Korean Government. Dr. You Chan Yang was born in Pusan. He grew up in Hawaii and took his medical degree at Boston University and his internship in medicine in New York City. Dr. Yang was practicing his profession as a physician when President Syngman Rhee made him ambassador from Korea to the United States two years ago. On tonight's Town Meeting subject: "What Next in Korea?" here is His Excellency, the Korean Ambassador, Dr. You Chan Yang. Dr. Yang.

### Dr. Yang:

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a warm satisfaction for me to have this opportunity to talk with you

frankly and personally about the circumstances that have developed in Korea. As you all know, it is a tragic fact that there has not always been agreement among the democratic peoples on how to deal with the undoubted aggression by communism in the Far East. In Europe, a line was drawn and it was accepted. But in Asia, the leading nations have all preferred to follow their own policies. Too often these policies have been reconciliation and acquiescence and compromise. This has been good for the communists but tragic for us, who have been on the firing line for our liberties and our lives.

The issue really came to a head through the dastardly attack by the communists against South Korea on a Sunday morning, June 25, 1950. Our government and our people made a tremendous decision to resist rather than to surrender—the first time such a decision was made by a free people in the post-war years. The United Nations, led by your own great country, the United States, acted with unprecedented speed and boldness in coming to our side to hurl back the communist aggressors. There has been a lot of discussion as to whether the United Nations intended to reunite Korea by force of arms. What we do know for sure is that on October 7, 1950, the United Nations armies did march north across the 38th parallel all the way to the Yalu River and did call for the establishment of a reunited, free, and democratic sovereign Korean nation.

This goal of the United Nations has been abandoned in the Panmunjom truce negotiations. We Koreans have done our best to establish three points in regard to the truce talks. First, we have



insisted on our own right to have a voice in the decisions that were being made about the very *destiny* and fate of our own nation. This right has been denied. At Panmunjom we have been only observers, never participants. Second, we have insisted that this terrible war would be a complete defeat for us and will lead to the strangulation of our nation unless it ends with Korea reunited.

Our allies have agreed that leaving Korea divided is a tragic defeat for Korea, but they have said we should accept it for the benefit of the rest of the free world. Third, we have warned most sincerely that a compromise truce will not be for the advantage of the free world but only for the communists. Compromise with aggression was tried at Munich and at Yalta, and it simply doesn't work. Nevertheless, against our strongest pleas, against our determination if need be to fight on alone, the United Nations has persisted in this compromise plan. What no one should ever forget is that the global war between communism and democracy is fought more with psychological than military weapons. Democracies must stand for individual freedom and for national independence.

The compromise plan, to submit the 70,000 anti-communist prisoners for three months of brain washing by communist agents, is a violation of individual freedom, just as the refusal to accept Korea as one of the participants in deciding the fate of our own country was a denial of our national independence. This is the enormously difficult and tragic situation with which we are trying to deal. The action of my government in freeing the anti-communist prisoners, many of whom have already

been imprisoned for over two years after they came into our lines bearing leaflets promising them their freedom, was not in any way directed against the United States or the United Nations.

We agree that our position of fighting at all costs against communist aggression and of standing in every way we can for the freedom of individuals is precisely in the democratic tradition which is represented so nobly by the United States. In everything I say and in everything my government may do, I hope you will never doubt the gratitude for America which is in every Korean heart. We have tried and we are trying to build and maintain a bastion of democracy in Asia. The odds against us are very heavy, but we hope we may always count on the American people and the United States Government to stand by our side. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

**Mr. Back:** And our thanks to you, Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador to the United States, for your opening statement. Before turning to Robert Aura Smith of the *New York Times* for his first question let me ask you, Dr. Yang, what are the exact terms tonight on which your government could accept a cease fire?

**Dr. Yang:** Our government is asking these points: First, we want simultaneous withdrawal of the communists and the UN forces from Korea. That's one. Second, we feel that the United States should give us a defense pact, in fact, your president has promised that. And the third is, if this political conference is to take place immediately after signing the truce agreement, you must have a time limit of ninety days, and then if the communists do not show any sincerity to bring about the

reunification and peace in Korea or anywhere else in the world, then we must take some definite action. And then of course the fourth point is that economic and military assistance, which your government has already promised, should be given to Korea.

**Mr. Back:** All right, it is time now to turn to Robert Aura Smith of the editorial board of the New York Times. He is a native of Denver, a Rhodes Scholar, once a college teacher, and since 1937 a staff member of the New York Times. Mr. Smith is an old Far Eastern hand; his reporting and wartime service have taken him many times out to the Far Pacific. He is the author of three books on Far Eastern problems. With the first question for Dr. Yang, there is Robert Aura Smith.

**Mr. Smith:**

Dr. Yang, I am in the position of the devil's advocate. I don't have to explain to you how deeply we love you and love your people. We are heart-sick over the tragic situation. What we are trying to do is make the best out of that situation. You said just a minute ago that the odds were very heavy against your people. There are a great many Americans, Doctor, who fear that this action at this time has made the odds so much heavier against your people. Somewhere, in some way, we must find a solution which keeps the whole of the South Korean cause united with the United Nations' cause. I don't know how to put a question as big as this to the Doctor, but it is true. How can South Korea survive without the United Nations?

I feel that we are in a position like the policeman who is looking out the window pleading with the man on the ledge and

saying, "Don't jump." We know that you have a suicidal bravery, but we don't want you to commit suicide, Doctor. Now what can we do? What can we do to keep the Korean position in line with the United Nations' position?

**Dr. Yang:** Mr. Smith, I appreciate your stand. When your forefathers were facing against all odds that great, most powerful country in the world that was England, did they ever draw back? Did they say, we cannot face them and fight them? They loved liberty and freedom and decency of life, so they fought and they won, and our people want to fight until their country is reunited so that they can live too as free men and free women and enjoy the dignity of man. (*Aplause*)

**Mr. Back:** Mr. Smith, before I turn to Dr. Oliver, do you want to raise the question of whether there is a real parallel?

**Mr. Smith:** Yes, I do indeed. We want you to win; that's the whole point. We want you to fight; we want you to win. But we don't want you to fight with the whole case stacked against you as hard as it may be. If the United Nations' support is withdrawn from the Republic of Korea, you face a million communist troops, to which you rightfully object, on the peninsula, but the United Nations and the United States are your defense against them.

**Dr. Yang:** May I remind you, Mr. Smith, you say we are facing a million Chinese communists who are poised up in the North, the northern half of my country, ready to attack us at any time at their will, don't you think we are living in fear all the time? If we are going to live in fear that we will be slaves under communism, we



would rather die in honor as brave men. (*Applause*)

**Mr. Back:** Thank you very much. Let us turn to Doctor Robert T. Oliver, the other interrogator, who has been anxious to get into this. If you don't mind, a short introduction first, Dr. Oliver. Dr. Oliver is an Oregonian by birth and education. He has also taught at colleges; in fact he is now professor of speech at Pennsylvania State College. Mr. Oliver is on Town Meeting tonight, however, as Manager of the Washington Bureau of the Korean Pacific Press, as a frequent consultant to the government of Dr. Rhee, and a frequent Korean visitor, and author of four magazine articles on Korea. Here is Robert T. Oliver. Mr. Oliver.

**Mr. Oliver:**

I am indeed eager to get into the discussion at this point, Mr. Back. As an American, as Mr. Smith is, I would like to deal with the question that he has raised. Korea would be in a bad way indeed if the United Nations and the United States should abandon Korea in the struggle it is in, but can we Americans for our own sake afford to abandon Korea? Can the United Nations for its own sake afford to abandon Korea? There are all kinds of people around the world, all kinds of nations around the world, and first of all is this global struggle between the communists on the one side and the free nations on the other.

And then there are other people who are neutral; there are other people who are uncertain where they stand. There are some peoples who want to oppose communism but don't dare. Now don't we, for the sake of our own survival and security in the future, need to do everything we desper-

ately and possibly can to encourage the spirit of nationalistic independence which makes people stand up and fight against communism even though the odds are heavily against them?

Mr. Ambassador, don't you believe yourself that there is a real parallel between the spirit which has impelled the Eastern Germans in their helplessness and without arms in their hands to stand up and courageously fight for their liberties against every odd? Isn't there a real comparison between that spirit and the spirit of the Korean people in saying, it is not whether we *choose* to go on alone, it's that we *must* go on and fight as long as we are alive for our liberties?

**Dr. Yang:** Yes, I agree with you, Dr. Oliver—absolutely. How can we assure one section of the world when they are trying to get away from communism, and then condemn the other section of the world because they are fighting communism actively and sacrificing everything they have so that you and I and all of us can be free and live the way we are, enjoying the democratic way of life? Don't you see it is very shortsighted? If Korea falls, Japan is untenable; then what happens? The Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China, Ceylon, Malayan Straits, Asia—we all fall. Ladies and gentlemen, let me tell you this: if that happens, then Russia has the largest manpower in the world and all the strategic material that she can ever use, and no other combination of nations in the world can defeat that combination.

**Mr. Back:** Mr. Robert Aura Smith, I think, wants to get down to the immediate matters of the moment. Is that right?

**Mr. Smith:** Well, I did want

to put in a comment there, but what Dr. Yang says is absolutely true, that if Korea falls we do lose our whole basis for security in the Pacific. But if the Korean cause is disrupted from the United Nations' cause, Korea will fall. A definite break at this point can be just as damaging; it is damaging to the Koreans themselves. What we have got to do, for heaven's sake, is find some way to clear this thing up and stick together on the thing. We can't possibly afford a situation in which the United Nations and the United States are taking one course of action and the Republic of Korea is taking another one. That would be fatal to both of us.

**Mr. Oliver:** Mr. Smith, I thoroughly agree with that point of view but let us always keep in mind the fact that the responsibility for preventing the break rests upon the United Nations just as much as it rests upon Korea. Korea has been blamed for acting unilaterally and releasing the prisoners of war, just acting on its own without consultation with the UN, but let's remember that the United Nations has always acted unilaterally in relation to Korea.

Korea has managed 70 per cent of the battle line; Korea has had to endure the devastation and suffering of the war far more than anyone else; casualties are far greater. It is Korea's very existence that is at stake. At Panmunjom the truce team has been a UN truce team with Korea represented only as an observer. These truce terms which the Korean Government and the entire Korean people, not only Syngman Rhee but the united Korean Nation, have rejected, those truce terms were drawn up by the ambassadors in Washington, D. C., the

ambassadors of the nations representing the United Nations; and were shown to the Korean Government, purely for information not for consultation, just an hour before they were given to the communists.

**Mr. Smith:** Bob, everything you say is true. We have had all the arguments on one side and none on the other. That's why I am saying, for heaven's sake, what ground can be gained for multilateral action? When can we and how can we get together? We have gone in one direction; the Koreans have gone in another.

**Mr. Oliver:** Well, let's lead them to Korea.

**Mr. Smith:** But how can we get together, Bob?

**Mr. Oliver:** Well, let's keep Korea as a member of the team, and not as a lackey who is something to take along or not without question.

**Mr. Smith:** Of course we want to do that.

**Dr. Yang:** May I say this? Our President for releasing the anti-communist prisoners, for that he is condemned, and yet when the communists released fifty thousand prisoners last year, and not only released them but made them into labor battalions and also impressed them into the communist army, did we raise a voice? Did we say it was a unilateral action? Did we say anything condemning them? No. And yet when these people have opened up their veins, signing a petition saying we want to fight against communists on your side, we are condemned because we let them go.

**Mr. Back:** Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I wonder if I may come in for a moment. I am just wondering where we will go if we



hold to the Rhee position. I believe that we have sought this truce because we feel that if we don't get a truce in Korea we may very well have to begin World War III in the Far East. Where do we go? Is that correct?

**Dr. Yang:** Mr. Gunnar Back, I have said repeatedly if we do make a positive stand against communism today we will not extend this war, but if we don't now, when the communists have a stock pile of atomic bombs and long-range bombers to carry them, you will have a terribly destructive war and the most horrible war that human beings have ever witnessed in their lives or in the history of the world. That is going to happen; and that will happen right here in this country, because this is the country that produces all these things to supply to the free world and they know that.

**Mr. Back:** Mr. Ambassador, you are saying now that if the communists do not agree to the terms that Syngman Rhee has in mind, we should move on to the Yalu, and you don't think that would precipitate a Third World War.

**Mr. Oliver:** I would like to agree with that position if I may quote the estimate of the New York *Times* in the presence of Mr. Smith who is on the editorial board. Yesterday, I believe it was, there was a very fine editorial in the *Times* which made the point that the communist empire is showing unmistakable signs of extreme weakness right now, and I think we all know that to be true—extensive famine in Red China, the revolts in Germany, the change in leadership inside Russia itself, and the fact that they have not yet been able to agree on leadership. Now is the time when the communist empire is extremely weak

and when it needs time to bolster its position. Now why should *we* be making the concessions? Why should we be sacrificing Korea to bide the time that the Communists need? Now is the time when we can afford to be bold and by being bold prevent World War III.

**Mr. Back:** Thank you, Dr. Oliver. Mr. Smith, Dr. Oliver is setting your paper on you. What is your answer?

**Mr. Smith:** I think that perhaps we have narrowed down a little bit the basis on which a truce has been sought. I don't believe that we went after a truce because we were afraid of World War III; I think we went after a truce for genuine humanitarian reasons, to avoid killing any more persons than we needed to, and we sought for an opportunity to pursue by parliamentary, political means this objective of the unification of Korea to which we ourselves are dedicated. There is no reason for us to retreat from that objective. Our enemies do not have the same humanitarian motives, and that has led to these two years of maddening negotiations. We are committed to try to stop that killing at this point if we can. I believe that since we are so committed, we are obliged to try also at this point, if we can, to keep our South Korean friends with us so that we can work together for their good, high purposes and for ours.

**Mr. Back:** Thank you, Mr. Smith. Mr. Ambassador, I know that you want to reply and you also, Dr. Oliver. But before I ask you to do that we have a question here that I think may help you to bring in your answers. Each week we invite our listeners to submit the question which they would like to hear discussed by the speakers. Mr. T. E. D. Freed of Los Angeles,



(California, will receive a handsome 20-volume set of the American People's Encyclopedia for sending us his question relative to the subject on Korea. Mr. Freed's question is: "If the South Koreans decide to fight on, as they say they will, what effect will this have on world opinion and the United Nations?" Dr. Yang.

**Dr. Yang:** I think the world must sit up and take notice that we Koreans are determined to fight communism and that we value our freedom, liberty, and the decency of life more than life itself. Some day all of you of the free world will say, "we should have gone along with them rather than to desert them."

**Mr. Back:** Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Oliver.

**Mr. Oliver:** I would like to refer to what Mr. Smith was saying a few minutes ago about our eagerness to stop this slaughter and save human lives. Any decent human being always has those goals in mind. But the question is whether and how. One can always stop slaughter by simply surrendering; there need not have been the slaughter at all if the Republic of Korea had simply surrendered when the Communists came in.

We tried at Munich, you remember, to avoid slaughter by concessions and by surrender and it didn't work. And the question is whether by saving some lives in Korea we may not be bringing upon ourselves the terrible disaster of an atomic war. Boldness in the face of aggression is the only thing that can possibly succeed. If history teaches us anything it teaches us that. And we will save far more lives in the long run by decisively defeating this aggression now than we will by encouraging further ag-

gression through weakness. (*Applause*)

**Mr. Back:** Robert Smith, do you have a question?

**Mr. Smith:** Yes, the question is what effect would a break between South Korea and the United Nations have on world opinion and on Korea. I think the effect at the present time is too tragic to contemplate. And I am simply startled beyond measure, Dr. Yang. If you called a session of the General Assembly next week, for example, without a composition of the differences between Korea and the United Nations and somebody introduced a resolution in the General Assembly saying that United Nations support should be withdrawn from the Republic of Korea not you nor I, sir, could guarantee that such a resolution would not get a majority, which I think would be catastrophic.

We are faced with a terrible situation. Bob, you talk about fighting for freedom and the Ambassador says he is perfectly willing to die, but the point is we don't want to see you die. We want to see you alive. We think you are too good to die. And I believe that the effect of that vote on world opinion would be the withdrawal of United Nations support and the effect on South Korea would be to open it wide to destruction, not only of life and property but to the destruction of liberty. Liberty still lives in your country, Mr. Ambassador, and we want it to continue.

**Mr. Back:** I will have to ask for a very short comment on that, Dr. Yang.

**Dr. Yang:** I want you to know, Mr. Smith, if peace, real peace, should come to Korea our people would welcome it with tears and

prayers of thankfulness, but I keep on saying what kind of peace. Is this a victorious peace or is this merely a compromise to lull the free world to sleep while the communists are preparing to the nth degree to attack us again? Don't you see if the political conference starts at the UN there will be an interminable talk, and what does it

accomplish? Nothing. Then where do you go from there?

**Mr. Back:** Dr. Yang, may I ask one question myself? Is it likely that Dr. Syngman Rhee will demand that the South Korean military forces be taken out of the UN command if necessary?

**Dr. Yang:** I am unable to tell you at this time.

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## QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

**Mr. Back:** All right. It is time now to turn to the questions from our audience. I see a gentleman here waiting, so go ahead and ask your question.

**Questioner:** Dr. You Chan Yang, how does South Korean President Syngman Rhee, in the face of his opposition to the UN truce negotiations, expect to unify all Korea without the aid of the UN?

**Dr. Yang:** That is a very good question. When you are faced with a problem, you don't go out to the football field because you think you are going to lose. You go out with the idea of winning. Our Koreans feel that we will try to win that game and we are going to. As I said previously, even if we all have to be exterminated in doing so, we will do.

**Mr. Back:** Thank you, Dr. Yang. Is there any comment on that from either one of the interrogators? All right, let's turn to this young boy here.

**Questioner:** Dr. You Chan Yang, why is South Korea's President Syngman Rhee so distrustful of the UN peace negotiation?

**Dr. Yang:** We don't distrust the UN or the United States; we are distrusting the communists. This UN proposal leaves Korea still di-

vided—this particular proposal at the present time. And a million communists are poised in the northern half of our country. The Chinese communists were branded as aggressors because they came and fought outside of their own territory. And these aggressors, a million of them, are still in Korea. They should be out of Korea if we are realistic about it, and so we are distrustful of the political talks because America has talked with the communists to reunite Korea for eight long years.

Where are we today? No nearer today than we were eight years ago. That is, the United States and Soviet Russia talked. All right, then are we going to talk eight more years or eighty years or a hundred years more while your boys and my boys are sitting on the hills of Korea? No. That's what we are distrusting.

**Mr. Back:** All right, thank you. Any comment on that? All right, we will go to you, please.

**Questioner:** This is to Mr. Smith. Do you think if all foreign troops were withdrawn from north and south Korea at once that unification could be easier if Syngman Rhee were to resign?

**Mr. Smith:** I know President



Syngman Rhee, and I know a good many of his people. I do not believe that Syngman Rhee as a person or as a leader is an issue in this case at all. I think this talk of deposing Syngman Rhee is nonsense. To change the mind of the Korean people, you don't have to depose one man, you would have to depose a nation. The Koreans are united in this thing. We have to get over this nonsense that this is an action by one man. This is an action by a people and we have to approach a whole people. No, the deposal or resignation of Syngman Rhee I don't think would make a particle of difference. I think a thousand men would jump up to take his place tomorrow who would do exactly what he has done.

*Mr. Back:* Is that correct, Mr. Ambassador?

*Dr. Yang:* That's right.

*Questioner:* Wasn't he rather unpopular at one time with his cabinet or parliament or whatever they have there?

*Mr. Smith:* The question is, was Syngman Rhee unpopular? There was a lot of opposition to Dr. Rhee in his parliament and among this people. For that reason I have never accepted the story that Dr. Rhee was a dictator, because you can't have your cake and eat it. You can't be a dictator and at the same time have fostered a large-scale opposition to yourself. (*Applause*)

*Mr. Back:* Yes, Dr. Oliver?

*Dr. Oliver:* May I add just one word? I am heartily in accord with everything Mr. Smith has said, and I want to add one aspect to it. We hear a lot of talk in the United States and from England about deposing Syngman Rhee and overthrowing his government. Don't

we realize how much harm that talk does to the American cause all around the world? We are talking as though we were a colonial power; we don't like a government, we overturn it and get a new one; we get somebody else we will like, and so on. Let's remember that the Republic of Korea is a sovereign nation operating under its own constitution and it has every right to choose the government it wishes to have. We do a lot of harm to American interests when we talk about deposing anybody around the world.

*Mr. Smith:* Let me add to that that our problem now is to compose differences and not to aggravate them. What we need above everything else is great patience and understanding. We don't need to smite anybody down. We need to get together and find the ground on which we can meet. Now I don't think that this action concerning the prisoners is right. I don't think it was wise. But I don't think we can do any good by calling a lot of names. The first thing we have to have right now is a moratorium on dirty epithets in headlines in the American press. (*Applause*)

*Mr. Back:* Thank you, Mr. Smith. We'll go back to the questions again on the floor. This gentleman, please.

*Questioner:* Dr. Oliver, could you enlighten me on how the police action developed into a war?

*Dr. Oliver:* Well, I would like to have somebody enlighten me as to what the term police action means in this instance. We have acted very, very peculiarly about it. We have acted as though a policeman were being sent in to expel a robber. We did brand first the North Koreans and then the Chinese as aggressors. That is, they

were breaking the law. The United Nations established that point. And then we went in and found it was inconvenient to punish them. We found it was inconvenient to throw them out of the area in which they were aggressing. Remember that in June, 1950, there was not a single, solitary Chinese Red soldier in any part of Korea and now there are a million of them.

And the United Nations which branded Red China as an aggressor because it had troops fighting in Korea is now trying to make peace with that aggressor and leaving it there. I would like to add this one word, that Syngman Rhee is trying—and I have talked with Syngman Rhee many many times, many intimate conversations over the last ten years—he is trying desperately hard not only to save Korea but to save the United Nations itself. In June of 1950, as we all can recall, the United Nations rose to a new height and created a new hope in all the peoples of the world because it had the courage to go in and deal with aggression. Now it has timidly backed down from that stand, and Rhee is trying to give it another chance.

*Mr. Back:* Dr. Oliver has just spoken. Now another question.

*Questioner:* Dr Yang, after a Korean truce, should not representatives of the United Nations General Assembly supervise early general elections in all Korea or is Mr. Rhee afraid of free elections?

*Dr. Yang:* Absolutely not. In fact, if you will look up the United Nations records in November, I spoke over there and said to Mr. Vishinsky when he was constantly saying that the United States, par-

ticularly the ruling circle, was fighting the Korean people, and this is what I said to Mr. Vishinsky at the United Nations: "I'll go one further, let's have a free plebiscite supervised by the United Nations throughout Korea, South and North, and if we Koreans should say we would rather live under the democratic form as United States and not under communism, will you shut up and get out?" I have never gotten an answer to that. Our president is not afraid, because I will tell you something. Mr. Henry Luce of *Time*, *Life* and *Fortune* magazine, who recently returned from Korea, said if the Iron Curtain at the 38th parallel is lifted tomorrow there will be absolutely no problem of communism in Korea.

*Mr. Back:* Thank you, Dr. Yang. One more question we have time for.

*Questioner:* Mr. Smith, has the United Nations the right to supersede the orders of an elected official of a nation as was done in South Korea?

*Mr. Smith:* The question is, has the United Nations the right to supersede? No, we don't act by virtue of right. We have to act in everything of this sort by virtue of agreement. We are a group of sovereign powers in the United Nations. We have to adjust our problems one to the other. We can't claim one right as against another. We have to work together. We have to find a way out together of a terrible and tragic difficulty.

*Mr. Back:* Well, thanks very much, gentlemen, I am sorry that our time is over, for your most informative discussion tonight.



## FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

### *Background Questions*

1. What is the significance of the Korean truce proposals?
  - a. Do they represent a victory for the U. N.?
  - b. Or, is the charge that they represent a "new Munich" justified?
  - c. Do they indicate that neither side will permit Korean unification within the other's military system?
2. Is there any possibility of restoring the status quo in Korea today? Or, has it been completely and irrevocably shattered?
3. What were the immediate and long-term objectives of the U. N. and U. S. in undertaking a police action in Korea three years ago?
  - a. Was it the fulfilling of a moral obligation or commitment under the U. N. Charter?
  - b. Was the action solely for the purpose of resisting aggression?
  - c. If so, did the crossing of the 38th parallel belie this objective?
  - d. Was there ever any intention of unifying Korea by force of arms?
  - e. Were U. S. and U. N. objectives relatively fluid, shifting with the military outlook?
4. Is the unification of Korea still the political goal of the U. N.?
  - a. Is there any likelihood that a unified, independent Korea based on free elections will result from the forthcoming political conference?
  - b. Can U. N. diplomats accomplish what U. N. soldiers have been unable to do?
5. What do Communist peace proposals in Korea indicate about their over-all objectives?
  - a. To what extent can recent Korean peace overtures be attributed to unrest within the Communist world?
  - b. What do these proposals indicate about the present state of Chinese-Russian relations?
  - c. Can they be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the Communists to divert their energies to other areas—e. g. Southeast Asia?
  - d. Are the Communists attempting, through a Korean truce, to promote disunity and weakness among the Western powers?
  - e. Are the Chinese particularly interested in reviving trade with Western powers?
  - f. To what extent are the Chinese motivated by a desire for membership in the U. N. and for control of Formosa?

6. What immediate benefits, if any, will a Korean truce afford the Chinese Communists?
  - a. Will their military position be greatly improved by the neutralization of U. N. air and naval superiority?
  - b. What effect will the elimination of U. N. air reconnaissance have on their military build-up in North Korea and Manchuria?
  - c. What effect will the withdrawal of U. N. forces from strategically placed islands off the coast of North Korea have on the Communist military position?
  - d. Will the Chinese Communists derive immediate economic (trade) and political (U. N. membership) benefits from a Korean truce?
7. What immediate benefits, if any, will the U. N. and U. S. derive from a Korean truce?
  - a. Will the fact of having successfully stopped aggression in Korea enhance the prestige of the U. N.?
  - b. Has the U. N. police action lessened the likelihood of future aggression?
  - c. Will a Korean truce afford the Western nations much needed economic relief? Or, is there a danger that we will let down our defenses too much and too rapidly?
8. How is a Korean truce likely to affect: NATO armament goals, EDC plans, U. S. defense program, the Japanese economy, Indo-Chinese war, etc.?
9. Is there any validity in the assertion that the truce will usher in a new period of international tension?
  - a. Will pressure for Big Four talks increase?
  - b. Will the question of admission of Red China to the U. N. divide the Western powers?
10. Has the South Korean government had adequate representation at the truce negotiations?
11. Is Dr. Rhee right in fearing a Korean truce along present lines?
  - a. Should the U. N. have held out for evacuation of all foreign troops from Korean soil?
  - b. Will the truce, by confirming the military division of Korea, make political unification practically impossible?
  - c. Has the U. N. in any way compromised its insistence for voluntary repatriation and a fixed period of captivity for war prisoners?
  - d. Are Switzerland, Sweden, India, Poland and Czechoslovakia all neutral powers? How should neutrality be defined?
12. Will the South Koreans attempt to "go it alone"? Can such a course of action possibly succeed?



13. Evaluate the recent action of the South Korean government in unilaterally freeing North Korean POWs.
14. Is a mutual defense pact between U. S. and South Korea advisable at this time? Would it meet with Senate approval?
  - a. Would such a pact mitigate against eventual unification of Korea?
  - b. Is a general U. N. guaranty more desirable?
15. Is there any validity in the charge that U. N. or U. S. has threatened to cut off military and food supplies to South Korea unless it accepts present truce terms?
16. What should the political conference following the truce attempt to cover?
  - a. Should it be devoted exclusively to Korea?
  - b. In view of the possibility of troops used in Korea being diverted to other areas in Asia, should Indo-China and Malaya be included on the agenda?
  - c. Should the conference attempt to discuss the status of Communist China in the U. N., Formosa, etc.?



## THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

(Continued from page 2)

his education at the Universities of Oregon and Wisconsin. From 1933-35 he was Dean at Clark Junior College and later taught speech at Bradley Polytechnic Institute, Bucknell University, and Syracuse University. During the summer of 1946, he was a guest lecturer at the University of Korea. Mr. Oliver has been manager of the Washington Bureau of the Korean Pacific Press since 1947. He has written twelve books. Four of them—as well as half a dozen pamphlets and over a hundred articles—are about Korea. He has also served as a consultant to various branches of the Korean government ever since it was inaugurated in August, 1945. Various missions took him to Korea in 1946, '49, '51 and '52 and he is planning to return again next month.



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